Leibnizs Theory of Space in the Correspondence with Clarke and the Existence of Vacuums (1) :: Space Philosophy Philosophical Papers

Leibnizs surmise of set in the Correspondence with Clarke and the Existence of Vacuums (1) ABSTRACT It is well known that a rally issue in the famous line of reasoning between Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Samuel Clarke is the temperament of stead. They disagreed on the ontological status of space rather than on its geometric or physical structure. Closely think is the disagreement on the human beings of vacuums in nature while Leibniz denies it, Clarke asserts it. In this paper, I shall focus on Leibnizs position in this debate. In part one, I shall hypothecate the conjecture of physical space which Leibniz presents in his letters to Clarke. This supposition differs from Leibnizs ultimate metaphysics of space, alone it is particularly interesting for systematic reasons, and it also gave rise to a vigorous discussion in modern philosophy of science. In part two, I shall examine whether the existence of vacuums is ruled out by that theory of space, as Leibniz seems to im ply in one of his letters. I shall confirm the result of E. J. Khamara (Leibnizs Theory of Space A Reconstruction, Philosophical Quarterly 43 1993 472-88) that Leibnizs theory of space rules out the existence of a certain kind of vacuum, namely extramundane vacuums, although it does non rule out vacuums within the world. IntroductionIt is well-known that a central issue in the famous debate between Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Samuel Clarke is the nature of space. Leibniz and Clarke, who did non only take a Newtonian standpoint, moreover was even help in designing his answers to Leibniz by Sir Isaac Newton himself, (2) disagree on the ontological status of space rather than on its (geometrical or physical) structure. Closely related to the disagreement on the ontological status of space is a except disagreement on the existence of vacuums in nature While Leibniz denies it, Clarke asserts it.In this paper I shall focus on Leibnizs position in the debate about these issues. In t he first part I shall try to reconstruct the theory of physical space which Leibniz presents in his letters to Clarke. In the due south part I shall examine, whether the existence of vacuums is ruled out by that theory of space, as Leibniz seems to imply in one of his letters (see below).To focus entirely on the correspondence with Clarke is a confinement I am witting of. The theory which I am going to reconstruct differs from Leibnizs ultimate metaphysics of space, (3) but it is particularly interesting for systematic reasons and it also gave rise to a watchful discussion in modern philosophy of science.